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ABSTRACT
Based on a time series of state cross sections for the period from
1975 through 1981, we find that motor vehicle accident mortality rates of
youths ages 15 through 17, 18 through 20, and 21 through 24 are negatively
related to the real beer excise tax. We also find that the death rate of
18 through 20 year olds is inversely related to the minimum legal age for
the purchase of beer. Simulations suggest that the lives of 1,022 youths
between the ages of 18 and 20 would have been saved in a typical year
during the sample period if the Federal excise tax rate on beer, which has
been fixed in nominal terms since 1951, had been indexed to the rate of
inflation since 1951. This represents a 15 percent decline in the number
of lives lost in fatal crashes. The simulations also suggest that the
lives of 555 youths per year would have been saved if the drinking age had
been 21 in all states of the U.S. These figures indicate that, if reduc-
tions in youth motor vehicle accident deaths are desired, both a uniform
drinking age of 21 and an increase in the Federal excise tax rate on beer
are effective policies to accomplish this goal. They also indicate that
the tax policy may be more potent than the drinking age policy.
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I. Introduction and Background
Since the mid 1970s, the Federal government of the United States and
various state and local governments have been involved in a campaign to
reduce deaths from motor vehicle accidents by discouraging alcohol abuse.
One major element of this campaign has been the upward trend In state mini-
mum legal ages for the purchase and consumption of alcoholic beverages that
began with the Increase In the legal drinking age in Minnesota from 18 to
19 years of age In 1976. An additional 27 states had increased legal
drinking ages by the time of the Federal Uniform Drinking Act of July 1984.
This legislation allows the Federal government, through its control of
Federal highway funds, to intercede in a legislative area traditionally
reserved for states. Five percent of a state's Federal highway construc-
tion fund allocation for the fiscal year 1987 will be withheld if the mini-
mum legal drinking age is below 21 years on October 1, 1986, and 10 percent
will be withheld from the 1988 fiscal year allocation if its drinking age
is below 21 on October 1, 1987. To date, 14 states have passed laws
complying with the act, and a total of 37 states now have a minimum
drinking age of 21. A second major element of the antidrinking campaign
is reflected by more severe penalties for conviction of drunken driving,
the allocation of additional resources to apprehend drunk drivers, and an
easing in the standards required for conviction.
One policy that has been virtually ignored by the Federal and state—2—
governments in the antidrinking campaign is increased taxation of alcoholic
beverages which, by raising prices, would lower alcoholic beverage corisump—
tion and motor vehicle mortality. Instead, the Federal excise tax rates on
liquor (distilled spirits), beer, and wine remained constant in nominal
terms between November 1, 1951 and the end of fiscal 1985. During this
period the Federal government taxed liquor at the rate of $10.50 per proof
gallon(one gallon of 100 proof liquor, which is the equivalent of 50 per-
cent alcohol by volume), beer at the rate of $.29 per gallon (approximately
4.5percent alcohol by volume), and wine at the rate of $.17 per gallon
1
(between 11.6 percent and 21 percent alcohol by volume).
Partly as a result of the stability of the Federal excise taxes and the
modest increases in state and local excise taxes, the real price of alcoho—
lic beverages (the nominal price divided by the Consumer Price Index) has
declined substantially over time. Between 1960 and 1980, the real price of
liquor fell by 48 percent; the real price of beer fell by 27 percent; and
the real price of wine fell by 20 percent (Cook 1981). While 29 states
raised the legal drinking age from 1976 through 1984, real alcoholic
beverage prices continued to fall: 27 percent for liquor, 12 percent for
beer, and 19 percent for wine (Bureau of Labor Statistics various years).
Thus, as argued by Cook and Tauchen (1982), if alcohol abuse is sensitive
to price, a government policy of declining real excise tax levels actually
may be exacerbating this problem.
A primary purpose of this paper is to investigate the responsiveness of
motor vehicle death rates of youths aged 15 through 24 to variations in the
cost of beer as reflected by differences in state excise tax rates on beer.—3-.
Thus, we provide evidence for this important age group on the extent to
which declining real beer excise taxes have contributed to increases in
fatal motor vehicle crashes and on the extent to which increases in real
beer taxes can serve as a potent instrument in the antidrinking campaign.
We also examine the effect of an increase in the legal drinking age on
youth motor vehicle deaths. Our empirical research is based on a time
series of state cross sections for the period from 1975 through 1981.
Logt motor vehIcle death rate regressions are obtained for three age
groups: youths aged 15—17, youths aged 18—20, and youths aged 21—24.
During the period at issue, 15 states raised their legal drinking age, and
21 states raised their nominal excise tax rate on beer. Moreover there
were substantial differences in both variables at a moment in time among
states.
We focus on teenagers and young adults in the context of the
antidrinking campaign because motor vehicle accident mortality is the
leading cause of death of persons under the age of 35, and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (1983) estimates that alcohol is
involved in over half of these fatal accidents. In 1979 persons under the
age of 25 accounted for 22 percent of all licensed drivers but 38 percent
of all drivers involved in fatal accidents (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration 1983). These figures are even more dramatic than they
appear because members of the young driver group do not drive nearly as
much as older drivers (Voas and Moulden 1980). In 1980 the motor vehicle
accident mortality rate of persons between the ages of 15 and 24 was 45
deaths per 100,000 population (National Center for Health Statistics—4—
1984). This figure was approximately twice as large as either the crude
motor vehicle death rate or any other age—specific motor vehicle death
rate.
Research on the responsiveness of youth motor vehicle deaths to the
cost of beer is particularly timely in light of proposals to correct the
erosion in the real value of the Federal excise tax rates on all forms of
alcoholic beverages since 1951 and to prevent future erosion by indexing
tax rates to the rate of inflation or by converting to an ad valorem alco-
holic beverage excise tax system (for example, Moore and Gerstein 1981;
Luks 1983; Cook 1984; Harris 1984; Becker 1985; Jacobson and Albion
1985).2 Moreover, although beer is the drink of choice among youths who
drink alcoholic beverages (for example, Coate and Grossman 1986; Grossman,
Coate, and Arluck forthcoming), the alcohol in liquor is taxed three times
as heavily as the alcohol in beer. This has led to suggestions to equalize
the tax rates on the alcohol in all forms of alcoholic beverages by raising
the tax on beer (for example, Harris 1984; Jacobson and Albion 1985).
Research on the sensitivity of youth alcohol use to legal drinking ages
is also valuable given the adverse reaction to Federal uniform drinking
4 legislation, its scheduled expiration at the end of fiscal 1988, and vola-
tility in state minimum drinking ages in the 1970s and 1980s.
There have been no previous studies of the effects of beer taxes on
youth motor vehicle fatalities. Cook (1981), however, finds that states
that raised their excise tax rates on liquor between 1960 and 1974
experienced below—average increases or above—average reductions in motor
vehicle deaths of persons of all ages relative to states that did not—5—
increase their tax rates. Given the popularity of beeramong young people
and their poor driving records, it is crucial to obtain estimates of the
Impacts of beer excise taxes on youth motor vehicle death rates.
Statistically significant short—run increases In youth motor vehicle
deaths have been reported in selected states that lowered their legal
drinking age in the early 1970s, and significant short—run reductions in
fatalities have been reported in selected states that raised their legal
drinking age in the late 1970s or early 1980s (for example, Williams et al.
1975, 1983; Douglass 1980; Wagenaar 1983; Lillis, Williams and Williford
forthcoming). While this research Is valuable, it is state—specific and
thus cannot be generalized to the population of all youths in the U.S.
More definitive estimates are contained in studies by McCornac (1982) and
Cook and Tauchen (1984), both of which employ time series of state cross
sections for the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. Cook and Tauchen use
data for the period from 1970 through 1977, while McCornac uses data for
the period from 1970 through 1975. Both studies conclude that a uniform
minimum drinking age of 21 in the mid 1970s would have saved a substantial
number of lives.
The research reported here differs from that by Cook and Tauchen andby
McCornac in two Important respects. First, McCornac arid Cook and Tauchen
deal with a period during which there was a downward trend in the legal
drinking age. In particular, between 1970 and 1975, 29 states lowered
their drinking age to conform with a Federal shift in the votingage from
21 to 18 in 1970. On the other hand, as noted previously we deal witha
period in which 15 states raised their drinking age. Second, we consider
the effects of beer taxes on youth motor vehicle fatalities.—6--
II. Analytical Framework
The basic model employed in this paper consists of two equations. One
is a technical relationship or a production function in which the probabi-
lity that a youth will experience a fatal motor vehicle accident (ii) is
positively related to his consumption of alcohol (y)5 and also depends on a
vector of additional variables (z):
=rr(y,z). (1)
Examples of members of the z vector include highway density in the state in
which the youth resides and the general quality and state of repair of the
motor vehicle that he drives. The second equation is a behavioral rela-
tionship or a demand function foralcohol:6
y =y(p,x). (2)
In this equation p is the price of alcohol, and x is a vector whose members
include the youth's command of real resources, the prices of substitute
goods, and tastes or preferences.
Substitution of equations (2) into equation (1) yields a reduced form
probability of death equation:
Tt rr(p,x,z). (3)
Equation (3) is termed a reduced form equation because alcohol consumption,
an endogenous right—hand side variable in equation (1), has been replaced by
its exogenous determinants. Of course, the demand function for alcohol
also is a reduced form equation.
Our empirical aim in this paper is to estimate equation (3) using data
for states of the U.S. This aim is facilitated by aggregating the equation
over the n youths in the th state and by interpreting the resulting pro——7—
bability of death as the observed motor vehicle mortality rate. The priri—
cipal hypothesis tested is that youth alcohol consumption is negatively
related to its price, and therefore the youth motor vehicle accident mor-
tality rate is negatively related to the price of alcohol. In testing this
hypothesis, we define price broadly as the sum of the direct cost of alco-
hol and the indirect cost that must be incurred to obtain it. Inpar-
ticular, the indirect cost of obtaining alcohol for a person under theage
of 21 should be lower in states where the legal drinkingage is 18 as
opposed to 21. Thus, subject to certain modifications in Section III, the
money price of alcohol and the legal drinking age play symmetrical roles in
the reduced form motor vehicle mortality equation.
III. Empirical Implementation
The data set employed here is a time series of state cross sections and
consists of the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. for the years 1975 through
1981. Hence there are 336 observations in each regression estimated in
Section IV. Alaska and Hawaii were omitted from the data set because
several important variables were missing for these two states. The
District of Columbia was omitted because it is a much smaller physical area
than any of the 48 states, and it is likely that many of its motor vehicle
accidents involve nonresidents. Table 1 contains definitions,means, and
standard deviations of the variables in the data set. A detailed descrip-
tion of the variables and their sources appears in the Appendix to this
paper (available upon request). The Appendix also includes a discussion of
the theoretical roles of variables other than the real beer tax, the beer—8—
Table 1
Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations of Variablesa
Variable Definition, Mean, and Standard Deviation
Motor vehicle death rate Deaths due to motor vehicle accidents per
100,000 population for the following three
age groups:
Ages 15—17, mean=31.581, s.d.=8.794
Ages 18—20, mean=51.468, s.d.=12.934
Ages 21—24, mean=41.921, s.d."11.401
Real beer tax Sum of Federal and state excise taxes on a
case of 24—twelve ounce cans of beer divided
by Consumer Price Index, 19671, mean=.518,
s.d.=.240
Beer legal drinking age Minimum legal age in years for the purchase
and consumption of beer, alcoholic content
more than 3.2 percent, meanl9.404,
s.d.=1 .391
Border age Sums of differences between own—state legal
drinking age and bordering states' legal
drinking ages (if positive) multiplied by
fractions of population living in border
counties. mean.208, s.d.=.389
Real income Money per capita personal income divided
by Consumer Price Index, 19671, expressed
in thousands of dollars, mean3.830,
s.d.'".447
Vehicle miles traveled Vehicle miles traveled in millions of miles
per licensed driver, mean=.011, s.d.".001
Young drivers Number of licensed drivers aged 24 or less
as a fraction of the population aged 15—24,
mean.726, s.d..090
Inspection of motor vehicles Dichotomous variable that equals one if
inspection of motor vehicles is required
every year, mean=. 548, s.d.=.498
Mormon Fraction of population who are Mormons,
mean.012, s.d..059
Southern Baptist Fraction of population who are Southern
Baptists, mean=.074, s.d.=.098
Catholic Fraction of population who are Catholics,
mean.210, s.d.. 127
Protestant Fraction of population who are Protestants
(excludes Southern Baptists and Mormons),
mean.199, s.d..080
Residents of "wet" counties Fraction of the population who reside in
fully or partially wet" counties (counties
that permit the sale of alcoholic beverages),
mean .967, s.d. .084
aData pertain to the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. for the years
1975 through 1981. Means and standard deviations, denoted s.d., of the
death rates are weighted by the age—specific number of persons in the cate-
gory at issue by state and year. Means and standard deviations of all
other variables are weighted by the number of persons aged 15—24 by state
and year.—9—
legal drinking age, and the "drinking sentiment" measures in the estimated
mortality equations. In addition it includes comments on preliminary
results obtained with several variables that are not listed in Table 1.
Separate motor vehicle accident mortality regressions are obtained for
three age groups: youths aged 15—17, youths aged 18—20, and youths aged
21—24. This is because the legal drinkingage ranges from 18 through 21.
Consequently, 15, 16, and 17 year olds are illegal drinkers in all states,
while 21, 22, 23, and 24 year olds are legal drinkers In all states. It
follows that youths between the ages of 18 and 20 should be most affected
by differences in the drinking age. Formally, we rejected the hypothesis
that slope coefficients but not intercepts are the same for the three age
groups.
Youths between the ages of 15 and 17 and between the ages of 21 and 24
are not excluded entirely from the analysis because they have higher motor
death rates than any other age group except for 18 to 20 year olds. Thus,
it is of interest to assess the impacts on these death rates of differences
in the cost of alcohol. A second consideration is that persons aged 21
through 24 or aged 15 through 17 may be passengers in cars driven by youths
aged 18 through 20 and may die in crashes caused by these drivers.
A third reason for not limiting the analysis to youths aged 18 through
20 is that differences in the legal drinking age can affect motor vehicle
fatalities of young teenagers and older youths. Since peers are a common
source of alcohol (for example, Blane and Hewitt 1977), the indirect cost
of obtaining alcohol for persons younger than 18 is lower in states where
the legal drinking age is 18 as opposed to 19, 20, or 21. To the extent— 10—
thatage at onset of alcohol consumption and current alcohol use are nega-
tively related [see Rachal et al. (1975) for evidence that this is in fact
the case], an increase in the legal drinking age can lower the motor
vehicle death rate of 21—24 year olds (the "consumption" effect). As
pointed out by Males (1986), a factor that goes in the opposite direction
is that persons beyond the age of 20 in states with low legal drinking ages
may have more knowledge of the amount of alcohol they can safely consume
shortly before driving (the "experience" effect).8
Studies of the impact of changes in legal drinking ages in individual
states or in a small number of states by Williams et al. (1975, 1983),
Douglass (1980), and Wagenaar (1983) employ one or more of the following
outcome measures:(1) nighttime fatal accidents involving youthful
drivers; (2) nighttime single—vehicle fatal accidents involving youthful
drivers; and (3) nighttime single—vehicle fatal accidents involving youth-
ful male drivers. On the other hand, our outcome measure, like the one
used by Cook and Tauchen (1984), is more comprehensive. We adopt it for
reasons given by Cook and Tauchen. They point out (1984, pp. 174—175):
"In evaluating alternative minimum drinking age legislation, it is
desirable to have as comprehensive a measure of the associated social costs
as possible. For example, from the evaluation viewpoint, it is more useful
to know the effect of MLDA [minimum legal drinking age] change on total
fatalities than nighttime fatal crashes....The Douglass—Wagenaar 'three fac-
tor surrogate'-—nighttime single vehicle crashes involving male drivers——is
only remotely related to any natural indicator of social costs." Thus, we
have chosen not to employ single—vehicle nighttime fatal accidents as an— 11—
outcomemeasure because the policy variables at issue mayaffectsingle—
vehicle daytime fatal crashes and multi—vehicle fatal crashes at all times
of the day or night.
Our outcome measure, like Cook and Tauchen's, is incomplete in that it
omits auto fatalities of persons under age 15 or greater than age 24 caused
by youthful drivers. Cook and Tauchen summarize data that indicate,
however, that most of the victims of fatal crashes involving youthful dri-
versare the drivers themselves or youthful passengers intheir vehicles.
Motor vehicle deaths by age were provided to us by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (N}ITSA) and come from unpublished data in
NHTSA's Fatal Accident Reporting System.9 Deaths pertain to state of
occurrence rather than to state of residence.
The key independent variables in the model are the legal drinking age
and the price of alcohol. Both pertain to beer because of its popularity
among youths. Moreover, Coate and Grossman (1986) and Grossman, Coate and
Arluck (forthcoming) report that the consumption of beer by youths is
inversely related to the price of beer and to the minimum legal age for its
purchase and consumption. They also report that the magnitudes of these
effects are substantial. On the other hand, the consumption of liquor or
wine by youths is much less sensitive to the relevant beverage—specific
price or legal drinking age, and there is no evidence that youths substi-
tute liquor or wine for beer when the price of beer rises.
Youths who reside in a state with a high legal drinking age may be able
to purchase and consume alcohol in a border state with a lower legal
drinking age. In turn they may be killed in motor vehicle accidents that— 12—
occurwhen they are returning from the border state. To deal with the
border phenomenon (out—of—state purchases), we note that more youthful
residents of the jth state are affected by it the greater is the difference
between the legal drinking age in that state (ad) and the legal drinking
age in the border state (ak, provided this difference is positive.
In addition, the border effect is larger the larger is the fraction of the
population of state j that live in counties that border on state k (f).
Hence we define the border age variable (ba) as
b. =f.(a.—a), if a. > a
jj j k k
b.0 if a < ak (4)
and include it asa regressor. With the resident—state legal drinking age
held constant, an increase in the border variable reflects a reduction in
ak or an increase in both of which should cause the motor vehicle
fatality rate to rise.'0
If motor vehicle deaths pertain to the state of residence, the measure
of b given above captures all elements of the border phenomenon. In our
data, however, deaths are tabulated by state of occurence. Nevertheless,
b still is a perfect indicator of theborder phenomenon provided youths
who travel from state j to state k to drink are killed in accidents that
occur within the boundary of state j. To the extent that some residents of
state j die in state k, certain modifications of the border variable may be
desirable. We do not pursue such modifications in this paper, but we indi-
cate how the results are affected when the border variable is omitted from
the regressions in Section
The cost of beer is given by the sum of the Federal and state excise— 13—
taxrates on a case of 24—twelve ounce cans of beer divided by theannual
Consumer Price Index (CPI, 19671) for the U.S. as a whole. Deflation by
the CPI is required to take account of trends in the prices of other goods
between 1975 and 1981. All regressions include dichotomous variables for
each year except 1981. Therefore, the measure of the real or relative
price of beer just defined is an accurate indicator of the true relative
price provided the relative price of beer exclusive of tax does not vary
from state to state. This follows because the tIme variables account for
any trend in the real price of beer exclusive of tax.
It should be stressed that the state excise tax is a preferable
regressor to the price of beer if the price exclusive of tax varies among
states because the supply curve of beer slopes upward. The reason is that
an outward shift in the demand function for beer simultaneously raises the
price of beer, the quantity of beer consumed, and the motor vehicle mor-
tality rate. Consequently, the coefficient of the price of beer in the
mortality equation is understated in absolute value if the equation is
estimated by ordinary least squares because price is positively correlated
with the disturbance term. In our context, the tax also is superior to the
price because the policy simulations performed in Section IV require
reduced form as opposed to structural parameter estimates.'2
To take account of the potential role of "drinking sentiment" in the
endogenous determination of beer excise tax rates, legal drinking ages, and
alcohol consumption, the fractions of the population who are Mormons,
Southern Baptists, Catholics, and Protestants (excluding Southern Baptists
and Mormons); and the fraction of the population who reside in "wet" coun—— 14—
ties(counties that permit the sale of alcoholic beverages) are included in
one specification of the motor fatality equations. Drinking sentiment
refers to cultural and taste variables that may either encourage or
discourage alcohol consumption. For example, antidrinking sentiment should
be relatively widespread in states in which religious groups that oppose
the use of alcohol, such as Mormons and Southern Baptists, are prevalent.
Antidrinking sentiment also should be an important force in states In which
a higher—than—average fraction of the population reside in "dry" counties
(counties that prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages). These states may
enact high alcoholic beverage excise tax rates as part of the political
process. In this situation, the tax coefficients that emerge from
regressions that omit drinking sentiment overstate in absolute value the
true parameters. On the other hand, states In which prodrinking sentiment
is prevalent (antidrinking sentiment is weak) and alcohol consumption is
large may enact high excise tax rates because the taxation of alcoholic
beverages is an attractive source of revenue. In this case, the tax
effects are understated if drinking sentiment is excluded from the
regressions. Similar comments can be made with respect to drinking age
effects that do not control for drinking sentiment.13
The role of drinking sentiment is considered in detail by Coate and
Grossman (1986) in the context of a formal econometric model. They empha-
size the point made above: namely, tax and legal drinking age effects are
not necessarily overstated in absolute value when drinking sentiment is
omitted from the regression model. This is particularly true If omitted
proxies for drinking sentiment are correlated with those included. Our— 15—
strategyhere is to fit a set of regressions that excludes the religion
variables and the fraction of the population who reside in wet counties and
a second set of regressions that Includes these variables.
An alternative estimation strategy to control for hard—to—measure
variables, such as drinking sentiment, is to employ dichotomous variables
for 47 of the 48 states. This is the strategy adopted by Cook and Tauchen
(1984) in their study of youth motor vehicle fatalities described in
Section I.In fact, the only other independent varIables In their model
are the legal drinking age and dichotomous variables for 7 of the 8 years
of their time series. Our approach, on the other hand, is to work with a
more fully specified model of the determinants of youth motor vehicle acci-
dent mortality rates. This is because a model with state dummies has the
potential of creating severe problems of multicollinearity. Nevertheless,
we view a model with state dummy variables as a reasonable alternative to
the one that we stress and present one regression for each of the three age
groups that includes dichotomous variables for 47 of the 48 states. Since
this specification is viewed as an alternative way to control for drinking
sentiment, the religion variables and the fraction of the population
residing in wet counties are omitted from it.
The actual motor vehicle mortality rate ——definedas deaths
per person rather than per 100,000 persons in the ith age group in the
th state in year t ——rangesbetween zero and one. Therefore, a logistic
equation for the death rate is specified:
={i+ exP[_ai+(_ik)(xk) —uj.t]}',— 16—
whereXitk is the value of thekth independent variable in the th state in
year t and is the disturbance term. By solving for the logarithm of
the odds of death from a motor vehicle accident relative to survival or
death from other causes [1Tj1/(1_rrt)], one transforms the logistic func-




which is called the logit function. The logit coefficient ik is the
percentage change in the odds of motor vehicle mortality for a one unit
change in Xjtk•
Maddala (1983) shows that a regression estimate of equation (6) should
employ weighted least squares. The weights are given by [njjtjjt(1_jjt)1hI2,
where n1 is the number of youths in the1th age group in the th state in
year t.This weighted least squares regression method is employed in
Section IV.
IV. Results
Weighted least squares regression estimates of logit motor vehicle
mortality equations for youths aged 15 through 17, 18 through 20, and 21
through 24 are contained in Panels A, B, and C, respectively, of Table 2.
Three regressions are shown in each panel. The first omits the religion
variables and the fraction of the population who reside in wet counties,
while the second includes these measures of drinking sentiment. The third
regression excludes the five drinking sentiment variables but includes









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































thestate variables are not presented. Each of the three regressions con-
tains an intercept and dichotomous variables for the years 1975 through
1980. The intercepts and the coefficients of the time variables are
omitted from the tables.
Focusing on the first two regressions in each panel, one sees that all
logit coefficients of the real beer tax are negative and statistically
significant at the 5 percent level of significance or better.
14At the
point of means, the elasticity of the death rate with respect to the real
beer tax is —.09 for the youngest age group and —.17 for the other two age
groups.'5 Data contained in Coate and Grossman (1986) indicate that the sum
of the Federal and state excise tax on a case of beer accounted for 13 per-
cent of the retail price of beer inclusive of tax on average in the period
from 1975 through 1981. Suppose that the beer industry is competitive and
has an infinitely elastic supply curve, so that a tax increase is fully
passed on to consumers. Then the elasticity of the motor vehicle death
rate with respect to the real price of beer would equal —.7 for 15
through 17 year olds and —1.3 for 18 through 20 year olds and 21 through
24 year olds.
How reasonable are elasticities that range from —.7 to —1.3? Cook
(1981) estimates an elasticity of the motor vehicle death rate of persons
of all ages with respect to the price of liquor of —.7. Thus our elastici-
ties appear to be quite reasonable. This is particularly true because
Coate and Grossman (1986) present arguments that suggest that youth price
elasticities of demand for alcoholic beverages may be larger in absolute
value than the corresponding adult price elasticities.— 19—
Basedon the first two regressions in Panels A through C, the only
negative and statistically significant legal drinking age coefficients per-
tain to youths aged 18 through 20. These are extremely plausible results
because 18 through 20 year olds should be most affected by differences in
the drinking age, which ranges from 18 to 21. The border age coefficients
have the appropriate positive signs for the middle age group in regressions
(2—B1) and (3—B2). In the latter model the coefficient is significant.
The above conclusions are not altered when the border age is omItted
from the regressions. As shown by the first two regression specifications
in Table 3, the legal drinking age coefficients remain significant for
youths aged 18 through 20. But the coefficients are not significant for
the two other groups.16 The drinking age coefficient in regression (3—2)
is almost 30 percent smaller in absolute value than the corresponding coef-
ficient in regression (2—B2), indicating that the magnitude of the estimated
effect is somewhat sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the border
age. The parameter estimates of the other regressors (not shown in Table 3)
are very similar to the corresponding estimates in Panels A through C of
Table 2.
The income and highway variables prove to be important determinants of
youth motor vehicle death rates. The income effect is negative, suggesting
that higher—income persons or their offspring are safer drivers andoperate
motor vehicles that are in better physical condition than lower—incomeper-
sons. These factors dominate the presumed positive relationship between
income and the demand for alcohol. Based on the second regression in each
panel, the income elasticities are similar in magnitude to the price— 20—
Table3






















at_ratios in parentheses. First equation excludes religion and resi-
dents of wet counties. Second equation includes these variables. Third
equation omits religion and residents of wet counties, butincludes dicho-
tomous variables for 47 of the 48 states.— 21 —
elasticities:—1.0forthe youngest age group, —.8 for the middle age
group, and —1.0 for the oldest age group.
An increase in the number of vehicle miles traveled per licensed driver
or in the fraction of youths aged 15 through 24 who are licensed drivers
raises each of the three age—specific death rates. The elasticity of the
death rate with respect to the number of vehicle miles traveled per
licensed driver is unity for each age group. A similar comment applies to
the magnitude of the elasticity of the death rate with respect to the frac-
tion of youths aged 15 through 24 who are licensed drivers. These results
underscore the plausibility of our empirical specification because they
imply that deaths per miles traveled by licensed drivers do not depend on
miles traveled per licensed driver or on the fraction of licensed
drivers.'7 States that require compulsory inspection of motor vehicles
every year have lower death rates than other states. Except for the middle
age group, this effect is significant only when the drinking sentiment
measures are held constant.
Comparing the first and second regressions in each panel of Table 2,
one sees that the signs, significance levels, and magnitudes of the tax and
legal drinking age effects are not in general affected by the inclusion of
the drinking sentiment proxies. If anything, the significant coefficients
become larger in absolute value when the religion variables and the frac-
tion of the population residing in wet counties are added to the set of
regressors. This is an important finding because it means that the tax and
drinking age effects emphasized here are not artifacts of the endogeneity
of state laws and decisionmaking. The estimated income and highway coef—— 22—
ficientsalso are not sensitive to the inclusion of the sentiment
variables, with theexceptionof the inspection coefficient noted above.
With regard to the drinking sentiment measures themselves, the coef-
ficient of the fraction of persons who reside in wet counties always is
positive and significant. The results for the religion variables are less
clearcut. Death rates are lower in states where Mormons and Southern
Baptists are prevalent, although the latter effect never is significant.
But death rates also fall as the fraction of the population who are
Protestants or Catholics rises. This result is puzzling because Coate and
Grossman (1986) find that the frequency of beer consumption by youths is
positively related to the prevalence of Protestants and Catholics in their
area of residence. We offer no explanation of the finding.We note,
however, that our conclusions with respect to the tax and legal drinking
age effects are not altered when the religion variables or the fraction of
the population who reside in wet counties are omitted from the drinking
sentiment vector.
The third regression in Panels A through C of Table 2 includes dicho-
tomous variables for 47 of the 48 states. This specification exhibits a
number of peculiarities. All three income effects become positive, and two
of the positive coefficients are significant. The coefficients pertaining
to vehicle miles traveled per driver and to the fraction of youths who have
drivers' licenses are greatly reduced. The sign of the inspection coef-
ficient switches from negative to positive. The drinking age effects for
18 through 20 year olds, which were negative and significant in the second
regression model, rises by slightly more than 50 percent in absolute value.— 23—
Thedrinking age coefficients for 15 through 17 year olds switches signs
from positive to negative and becomes significant. For the oldest age
group, the negative drinking age coefficient rises by a factor of four and
becomes significant.
The above results suggest that a model with state dummies is over—
determined and plagued by multicollinearity. The implausible nature of the
estimates that emerge from this specification provides a justification for
not emphasizing it. The tax effects rise in absolute value when the state
dummies are held constant, except for the middle age group where the coef-
ficient is virtually unchanged. Thus, the negative tax effects that we
report are quite robust. In particular, they cannot be attributed to
unmeasured state—specific variables.
To evaluate the potential impacts of the Federal excise tax and legal
drinking age policy initiatives discussed in Section I, we simulate their
effects on youth motor vehicle accident mortality rates. Specifically,
first we compute the "actual" mortality rate for a given age group by
predicting the mortality probability for the jth state in year t(j.)
based on the logit coefficients and the actual values of the independent
variables (xjtk) for that observation [see equation (5)]. Then we obtain
the actual death rate as a weighted average of the 336 computed probabili-
ties (48 states times 7 years) multiplied by 100,000. The weight is the
fraction of the total population of all youths in the th age group in
the period from 1975 through 1981 who reside in the th state in year 18
Next we vary one or more of the independent variables by a certain amount,
recompute each irj., and average to obtain to the "new" mortality rate.— 24—
Thesimulations are restricted to 18 through 20 yearolds because public
policy with respect to the legal drinking agefocuses on this age group.
Simulations based on the second regression model inTable 2 are emphasized,
but simulations based on the third regression modelalso are presented for
comparative purposes.
The legal drinking age policy pertains to a uniformminimum age of 21
for the purchase of beer in all states. This policyis simulated by
setting the legal drinking age equal to 21 foreach of the 336 observations
in the regression and by setting the border agevariable equal to zero.
The resulting mortality rate is the one that would havebeen observed if
the legal drinking age had been 21 in all states throughoutthe period from
1975 through 1981.
Three Federal excise tax policies are considered.The first indexes
the Federal excise tax rate on a case of beer, whichhas been fixed at $.64
in nominal terms since 1951, to the rate of inflationsince 1951. It is
termed the inflation tax policy. Under it, the real beer taxin the




where is the state excise tax rate in nominal terms, c5i isthe CPI
in year trelativeto 1951, and cr67 is the CPI in year t relative to
1967. The second tax policy raises the excise tax on a caseof beer from
$.64 to $2.09 to equalize the rates at which thealcohol in beer and liquor
are taxed (see note 3).It is termed the alcohol tax equalization policy.
In this simulation the real beer tax is given by— 25—
= (r+$2.O9)/(c67). (8)
Thethird tax policy combines the first two and is termed the
combined tax policy. The real beer tax becomes
ci =[rt
+($2.O9)(ct,5i)1/(c67). (9)
The resulting simulation shows the mortality rate that would have prevailed
if the excise tax rate on beer had been fixed in real as opposed to nominal
terms during the 1975—1981 period and if the alcohol in beer had been taxed
as heavily as the alcohol in liquor.
Note that substantial tax hikes are involved In the last three simula-
tions. Indexation of the nominal Federal excise tax on beer to the rate of
Inflation produces a tax on a case of beer in 1978 (the mid year of the
sample period) that is 2.5 times larger than the actual tax. Equalization
of the tax on the alcohol on beer with that on the alcohol in liquor produ-
ces a beer tax that is 3.3 times as large as the actual tax. Both policies
combined amount to an approximately eight fold increase In the Federal beer
tax in 1978, which would have raised the nominal price of beer by roughly
60 percent in that year.'9Note also that the Inflation tax policy would
have caused the nominal price of beer to rise by approximately 12 percent
in 1978.This percentage increase in price is almost the same as the per-
centage increase in the legal drinking age that results when it is raised
from its sample mean of 19 to 21.
Table 4 contains the results of the simulations. The figures in Panel
A are obtained from the regression model with the religion variables and
the residents of wet counties. Those in Panel B are obtained from the— 26—
Table4
Predicted Effects of Imposition of Uniform Legal Drinking Age of 21 or
Increase in Federal Excise Tax on Beer on Motor Vehicle



































aDeath rate and absolute change are expressed in terms of deaths per
100,000 population. Absolute change equals the actual death rate minus the
death rate predicted by one of the four policies at issue. Percentage
change equals the absolute change divided by the actual death rate and
multiplied by 100.— 27—
regressionmodel with the state dummy variables.
Based on Panel A, a uniform legal drinking age of 21 throughout the
period would have reduced the death rate of youths ages 18 though 20 (52
deaths per 100,000 population based on the actual values of all indepen-
dent variables) by 4 deaths per 100,000 population. This represents an 8
percent decline in the number of youths who would have died in motor
vehicle crashes. The corresponding reduction in Panel B is 12 percent.
More dramatIc declines are produced by the excise tax tax policIes
Since these results are not sensitive to the regression model used, we
focus on the results In Panel A. The number of deaths falls by 9 per
100,000 population if the Federal excise tax rises at the rate of infla-
tion, which represents a 15 percent decline in the number of lives lost in
fatal crashes. The policy that taxes the alcohol in beer and liquor at the
same rates has a slightly bigger effect. It saves 11 lives per 100,000
population, which represents a 21 percent reduction in the number of lives
lost. The combination of both tax policies causes the mortality rate to
fall by 28 deaths per 100,000 population, which represents a whopping 54
percent reduction.
It is notable that a 12 percent increase in the price of beer which
accompanies the Inflation tax policy appears to have a larger impact than a
10 percent increase in the legal drinking age even when the 12 percent
drinking age effect from Panel B is used in the comparison. In part this
conclusion is reached because many states had legal drinking ages of 21 in
one or more years of the period. Therefore, we have simulated the death
rates of 18 through 20 year olds under the assumption of a uniform legal— 28—
drinkingage of 18. Based on the regression model with the antidrinking
sentiment measures, the mortality rate in the latter simulation exceeds the
one in the simulation with a drinking age of 21 by 7 deaths per 100,000
population. The corresponding differential in the regression with the
state dummies is 10 deaths per 100,000 population. The former differential
but not the latter is smaller than the 8—deaths--per—100,000—population
reduction produced by the policy to adjust the beer tax for inflation.
Our preferred regressIon model indicates that 8 percent fewer youths
would have died in motor vehicle crashes if the drinking age had been 21 in
all states during the period from 1975 through 1981. On the other hand,
Cook and Tauchents (1984) results suggest that the drinking age policy
would have lowered the death rate by approximately 4 percent during the
period from 1970 through1977.20 In part our estimate is larger than their
estimate because they do not control for the border age. Indeed, we pre-
dict a reduction of 5 percent when the border age is omitted from the
regression. Our figure also may exceed Cook and Tauchen's because the mean
drinking age may have been higher in their sample period than in ours.
To summarize the qualitative results of the logit equations, negative
and statistically significant real beer tax effects are obtained for youths
aged 15 through 17, 18 through 20, and 21 through 24. Negative and sta-
tistically significant legal drinking age effects are obtained for youths
aged 18 through 20. These results cannot be attributed to the omission of
drinking sentiment from the estimating equation because we control for this
phenomenon by including religion measures and the fraction of the popula-
tion who reside in counties that permit the sale of alcohol as regressors.— 29—
Quantitatively,the enactment of a uniform drinking age of 21 in all
states would have reduced the number of 18 through 20 year olds killed in
motor vehicle crashes by 8 percent in the period from 1975 through 1981. A
policy that fixed the Federal beer tax in real terms since 1951 would have
reduced the number of lives lost in fatal crashes by 15 percent, while a
policy that taxed the alcohol in beer at the same rate as the alcohol in
liquor would have lowered the number of lives lost by 21 percent. A com-
bination of the two tax policies would have caused a 54 percent decline in
the number of youths killed.
The preceding figures suggest that, if reductions In youth motor
vehicle accident deaths are desired, both a uniform drinking age of 21 and
an increase in the Federal excise tax rate on beer are effective policies
to accomplish this goal.2' They also suggest that the tax policy may be
more potent than the drinking age policy. Indeed, according to our com-
putations, the lives of 1,022 youths aged 18 through 20 would have been
saved by the inflation excise tax policy in a typical year during the
period from 1975 through 1981, while the lives of 555 youths would have
been saved by the drinking age policy.
It does not follow that we have provided enough evidence to justify
the approximately eight fold (thirteen fold based on the 1984 CP1) increase
in the Federal excise tax on beer that is implicit in the most comprehen-
sive tax policy. Excise tax hikes impose welfare costs on all segments of
the population, while a drinking age policy is targeted at thegroup in the
population that accounts for a disproportionate share of motor vehicle
accidents and deaths. On the other hand, the enforcement and administra—— 30—
tivecosts associated with a uniform minimum drinking age of21 may exceed
those associated with the tax policy. Moreover, our resultsindicate that
an excise tax increase lowers death rates of youthsbetween the ages of 15
and 17 and between the ages of 21 and 24. These benefits do not accompany
a rise in the drinking age. In addition, the tax policy mayreduce fatal
crashes involving adults.
Finally, Becker (1968) has shown that the optimal way for a societyto
deter offenses is via a system of monetary fines. Of course, youthful
drunken drivers may respond to an increase in the fine for this offense
only if the probabilities of apprehension and conviction arenontrivial.
If substantial resources must be allocated to raising these probabilities,
the excise tax policy may be preferable to or complementary with a system
of large fines. In conclusion more research is required to formulate the
best mix of policies to deal with youth motor vehicle accident mortality.
Our study represents a useful step in this process.F—i
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'The Federal excise tax rate on distilled spirits was raised from
$10.50 per proof gallon to $12.50 effective October 1, 1985, as part of the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.
2Under an ad valorem alcoholic beverage excise tax system, the tax rate
would be set at a fixed proportion of wholesale price.
3Under the Federal excise tax on liquor of $10.50 per gallon of liquor
(50 percent alcohol by volume) in effect prior to October 1, 1985, one
gallon of alcohol in liquor was taxed at a rate of $21. Since the Federal
excise tax on beer is $.29 per gallon and since one gallon of beer contains
4.5 percent alcohol by volume, the tax rate on one gallon of alcohol in
beer is $6.44. The alcohol in liquor is taxed fifteen times as heavily as
the alcohol in wine, and the proposals mentioned above also contain provi—F—2
sionsto correct this distortion.
4At least two states ——Texasand Kansas ——haveadopted laws that will
revoke the 21 drinking age as soon as the legislation expires (Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety 1985).
51f a youth never drives while under the influence of alcohol, an
increase in alcohol consumption would not increase his probabilityof dying
in a motor vehicle crash. We believe, however, that it is reasonable to
suppose that the number of times that a youthdrives while under the
influence of alcohol or is driven by a friend in this state is positively
related to his consumption of alcohol, at least for the average youth.
6The demand function for alcohol results from the maximization of the
youth's utility function subject to his income constraint andhis probabi-
lity of death equation.
7The male death rate is approximately three times as large as the
female death rate for the cohort of persons aged 15 through 24. Sex—
specific regressions are not presented because we tested and acceptedthe
hypothesis that slope coefficients but not intercepts arethe same for
males and females. Since there is almost no variation in the fraction of
15 through 24 year olds who are females across states, this variable is not
included as a regressor.
8The existence of an experience effect suggests that the legal drinking
age could have a positive regression coefficientin the motor vehicle acci-
dent mortality equation for the older youths. This is not the case for the
younger youths because they are both inexperienceddrinkers and because an
increase in the drinking age raises their indirect cost of obtainingF—3
alcohol.
9me Fatal Accident Reporting System is described in detail in NHTSA
(1983). Motor vehicle deaths were not taken from the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS) because NHTSA data are available on a much more
timely fashion. In particular, NCHS figures for the years 1979, 1980, and
1981 were not available when this project was begun. Note that NCHS
reports motor vehicle deaths by state of residence. Note also that NHTSA
tabulates alcohol—related motor vehicle fatalities. We did not use these
data because the Identification of alcohol—related crashes Is made by the
police based on methods that may vary from state to state.
10Suppose that there are inborderstates, each of which has a lower
drinking age than state j. Then b becomes
b =k=ljkj
ak).
'11f residents of state j who drink in state k are as likely to die In
that state as In state j, bk could be set equal to b rather than to zero.
Given more than one border state and little information about the precise
location of accidents involving youths who leave their state of residence
to drink, the construction of an appropriate border variable becomes
somewhat arbitrary.
'2Cook and Tauchen (1982) present a similar argument In the context of
the estimation of demand functions for liquor. The transactions price of a
single leading brand of medium priced, nationally sold beer is available
for two unidentified major markets in each state for the years 1976, 1977,
and 1978 (see Ornstein and Hanssens 1985 and Coate and Grossman 1986). InF —4
addition to the reasons given above, this price is not used here because it
would have to be predicted for the years 1975, 1979, 1980, and 1981 from a
regression that includes dichotomous variables for 47 of the 48 contiguous
states. This would create severe problems of multicollinearity in the
motor vehicle mortality regression model specified below that Includes
dichotomous variables for the states. Note that state excise tax rates on
wine and liquor are poor proxies for the prices of wine and liquor In
control (monopoly) states because such states derive most of their revenue
from the sale of wine and liquor from the price markups rather than from
the excise taxes. This comment does not apply to state excise tax rates on
beer because beer is sold privately In monopoly states.
'3Although it might appear as if the drinking age effect is overstated,
this need not be the case. For example, adult voters in a state with a
vocal minority who opposes alcohol consumption may enact a high legal
drinking age to prevent the minority from campaigning to raise alcohol
excise tax rates. To cite another illustration, the high mortality rate in
a state where prodrinking sentiment is widespread may result in the enact-
ment of a high legal drinking age.
'4Statements concerning statistical significance in the text are based
on one—tailed tests except when the direction of the effect is unclear on a
priori grounds or when the estimated effect has the "wrong sign." In the
latter cases two—tailed tests are used. When no significance level is
indicated, it is assumed to be 5 percent.
'5These elasticities are based on the second regression in each panel.
The formula for the elasticity (c1) isF—5
ci =ikijt)xjtk
where is the real beer tax and is its logit coefficient. We eva-
luate c at the weighted sample means of andXjtk (see Table 1). Note
that the mean death rates in Table 1 must be divided by 100,000 before the
elasticities are computed.
'6The negative legal drinking age coefficient for the 21 through 24
years olds in regression (2—C2) is not significant at the 5 percent level
for a two—tailed test. This is the appropriate test because the experience
factor suggests a positive effect, while the consumption factor suggests a
negative effect (see Section III). Since the age coefficient is negative,
our results, like those of Cook and Tauchen (1984), do not support the
experience hypothesis proposed by Males (1986).
1-7Strictiy speaking, the above proposition holds for the following
logarithmic regression model:
in(d ./m..) =a.+ 3 x..
ii ]J 1 i.j
Here d1. is the number of deaths in the 1th age group in the th state,
is the number of miles traveled by licensed drivers in this age group,
x is the vector of exogenous variables, and time supscripts are
suppressed. As an identity,
m1 E
where n is the number of persons in the 1th age group, w1. is the
fraction who are licensed drivers, and in .isthe number of miles driven
ij
per licensed driver. Therefore,
in ¶E ln(d ./n..) =a+•x+in w .+ in
iJ ii 1j 11J ij ij




where rn1 denotes the number of miles driven by licensed drivers of all
ages divided by the number of licensed drivers of all ages in the
state, w1524 is the fraction of licensed drivers ages 15 through 24,
and the factors of proportionality (s and v) do not vary among states.








Asshownby Table 4, differs from the corresponding mean in Table 1.
This is because the logit regression does not necessarily pass through the
point of weighted arithmetic means. But the difference is very small; in
a given regression model it is always less than 1 death per 100,000 popula-
tion.
'9Since the excise tax and legal drinking age increases are non marginal
and the logit functions are nonlinear, the simulations are employed to eva-
luate their effects. This is preferable to computing marginal price or
legal drinking age effects at the point of means or for each observation
and then multiplying by the change in the policy variable at issue.
20We computed the 4 percent figure based on Table 5 (p. 186) in Cook
and Tauchen (1984).
21Some caution should be exercised in applying the results of theF —7
drinking age simulation to the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act of 1984
because the mean legal drinking age in that year was somewhat higher than
in the period of our sample. On the other hand, as pointed out in Section
I, a long—term prohibition of purchases of alcoholic beverages by persons
below the age of 21 is not a fait accompli because the penalties imposed
on states that do not raise their drinking age to 21 by the Federal Uniform
Drinking Age Act expire at the end of fiscal 1988. Therefore, the figure
given above probably is reasonable to use in a long—term evaluation of the
drinking age policy.R- 1
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APPENDIX
Motor Vehicle deaths by age were provided to us by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and come from unpublished data in
NHTSA's Fatal Accident Reporting System. Deaths pertain to state of
occurrence rather than to state of residence. Populationdeflators by
single years of age for 1980 were taken from the 1980 Censusof Population
(Bureau of the Census 1983). Population figures for the age groups15
through 19 and 20 through 24 for 1975 were obtained from the Area Resource
File (Applied Management Sciences 1980) and pertain to estimates prepared
for the National Cancer Institute. Figures for years other than 1975 and
1980 were derived by logarithmic interpolation and extrapolation.
Population estimates for years other than 1980 were adjusted sothat the
age—specific sum for any year coincided with the U.S. figure reported by
the Bureau of the Census (1982). Population data by single years of age
for years other than 1980 were computed by assuming, for example, that the
state—specific ratio of youths aged 18 to youths aged 15 through 19 in1975
was the same as in 1980.
The minimum legal age for the purchase of beer (alcoholic content more
than 3.2 percent by weight) was taken from Wagenaar's (1981/82) painstaking
and definitive compilation of this age for every state for the years 1970
through 1981. A few states have two legal drinking ages for beer. One age
is for beer that contains 3.2 percent or less alcohol by weight, and the
second and higher age is for beer that contains more than 3.2 percent alco-
hol by weight. We use the latter variable, but it is very highly corre-
lated with the former variable and with the legal drinking ages for liquorA-2
and wine.
If a state raised Its legal drinking age during the year rather than on
January 1, the legal drinking age Is given as a weighted average of the two
ages, where the weights are the fraction of months each age was in effect.
For example, suppose a state raised its legal age for the purchase of beer
from 18 to 21 on April 1, 1980. Its legal drinking age for that year is
(3/12)(18.00) +(9/12)(21.00)=20.25.
This is the procedure employed by Cook and Tauchen (1984).
The cost of beer is given by the sum of the Federal and state excise
tax rates on a case of 24—twelve ounce cans of beer divided by the annual
Consumer Price Index (CPI, 1967=1) for the U.S. as a whole. The Federal
excise tax on a case of beer was fixed in nominal terms at $.64 throughout
the period. State excise tax rates were obtained from the U.S. Brewers
Association (1984). If a state raised its tax during the year rather than
on January 1, its tax for that year is given as a weighted average of the
two rates, where the weights are the fraction of months each rate was in
effect. As long as the time variables are held constant, it makes no dif-
ference whether the real Federal excise tax is included in or excluded from
the tax measure. Inclusion of the Federal tax facilitates the simulations
in Section IV.
Real per capita personal income should be positively related to the
demand for alcohol, positively related to the quality and condition of
motor vehicle, and positively related to safe—driving practices. The last
relationship emerges because income and schooling levels are positively
related. In turn, more educated persons and their offspring are likely toA-3
be safer drivers. Attempts to test this proposition were not possible
because of a high correlation between income and median years of formal
schooling completed. It follows that the predicted effect of income on the
death rate is ambiguous. The income variable was taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (various years).
Three highway measures are included in the regressions: the number of
vehicle miles traveled in millions of miles per licensed driver, the number
of licensed drivers aged 24 years or less as a fraction of the population
aged 15 through 24, and a dichotomous variable that identifies states that
require compulsory inspection of motor vehicles every year. Similar
variables have been used in interstate studies of the determinants of motor
vehicle death rates of all age groups by Fuchs and Leveson (1967) and
Peltzman (1975). The number of vehicle miles traveled per driver obviously
reflects motor vehicle use and is expected to have a positive regression
coefficient. In addition highway driving density probably rises as the
number of miles traveled per driver rises. Highway driving density (the
ratio of vehicle miles traveled to highway miles) has an ambiguous impact
on mortality on a priori grounds. On the one hand, increased density is
expected to increase the probability of an accident at a given speed and
therefore the risk of death. On the other hand, increased density may
force the average speed limit to be lower and can result in fewer deaths.
In preliminary regressions a density measure was not statistically signifi-
cant, and its inclusion had almost no effect on the coefficients of the
other variables.
In general young drivers are more accident prone than older drivers,A- 4
possibly because the former group has a higher demand for risky driving
(Peltzman 1975). Thus, an increase in the per capita number ofyoung dri-
vers should cause the death rate to expand. Nonwhite youths have much
lower motor vehicle death rates than white youths (National Center for
Health Statistics 1984). In preliminary regressions the fraction of the
population aged 15 through 24 who are nonwhite was not a significant pre-
dictor of the death rate because of a large negative correlation between it
and the fraction of the population aged 15 through 24 with drivers' licen-
ses. Note that death rates by race are not available from NHTSA. States
with compulsory motor vehicle inspection programs are expected to have
lower death rates than other states because these programs should result in
safer vehicles being operated by the driving public. The number of
licensed drivers of all ages, the number of licensed drivers aged 24 or
less, and the number of vehicle miles traveled were taken from the Federal
Highway Administration (various years). The number of licensed drivers for
the years 1976, 1978, and 1980 was obtained by linear interpolation. That
is, the number of drivers in 1976 in a given state was computed as a simple
average of the number in 1975 and the number in 1977. The Federal Highway
Administration estimates vehicle miles of travel from data on gasoline con—
sumption and motor vehicle registration by state. The compulsory inspec-
tion variable was obtained from the Council of State Governments (various
years).
The measure of residents of wet counties was obtained from the
Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (various years). Religion
variables for the years 1971 and 1980 were taken from surveys conducted byA- 5
the National Council of the Churches of Christ and the Glenmary Research
Center (see Johnson, Picard, and Quin 1974; Quinn et al. 1982). Estimates
for other years were computed by logarithmis interpolation and extrapola-
tion. Jews are included with non—church members in the omitted category
because the size of the Jewish population was not reported in the 1971 sur-
vey and was significantly underestimated in the1980 survey.
In preliminary research we experimented with variables pertaining to
the availability and regulation of alcohol including the per capita number
of establishments that are licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, a dichoto-
mous variable that indicates whether off—premise alcoholic beverage stores
are state owned and operated, a dichotomous variable that indicates whether
drug and grocery stores can sell alcoholic beverages, and a dichotomous
variable that indicates whether billboard advertising of alcoholic bevera-
ges is allowed. These variables contributed little to an understandingof
the determinants of motor vehicle fatalities, and their inclusion had
little impact on the coefficients of the basic regressors. These results
are consistent with Arluck's (in progress) findings that youth alcohol use
is not sensitive to the measures just defined. We also experimented with
variables pertaining to the probability of apprehension and conviction for
drunken driving and to the penalties for this offense. Our conclusions
with respect to these variables were similar to those with respect to the
availability and regulatory variables. In part this may reflect reverse
causality. In particular, states with high death rates may allocate a
substantial amount of resources to the apprehension and punishment of drunk
drivers.A- 6
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